The Intelligence Failures That Led to the January 6 Attack on the Capitol
Seriously, How Did Capitol Law Enforcement Not See This Coming?
If you’ve followed me on Twitter, listened to the Peach Pundit Podcast, or talked to me in person since January 6, 2021, you know how angry I am about the events of that day. Well, not only the events of that day but also the constant lies from the ex-President and his cult-like followers about the 2020 presidential election.
Between January 2017 and November 2020, I had to pretend that I gave a damn about the Trump administration when I didn’t. I loathed Trump. I resigned from my post in my local Republican Party over his nomination. I still loathe him. I found him to be a generally disgusting person without any real core convictions. He cares only about himself. He was unfit to be president, and his continued involvement in politics is bad for the country.
Don’t get me wrong. I’m glad several things I worked on got signed into law during this time, including the First Step Act, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, and the Right to Try Act. (Admittedly, I have mixed feelings about TCJA today. I was really happy to have played a small part in getting that bill passed, even though there was some drama that I had to deal with at the time. The mixed feelings come from the explosion in federal spending during the pandemic. I knew that it was highly unlikely that Republicans would do anything to cut spending in aftermath of TCJA, but the spending during the pandemic caused me a great deal of heartburn. That’s a post for another day, though.)
I’ve generally viewed the investigation and public hearings conducted by the Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol as having a net public benefit. I watched most but not all of the hearings because what happened before and after January 6 changed my view of a lot of people were colleagues and friends. Obviously, the select committee’s work was controversial. A bipartisan commission would’ve been ideal. Unfortunately, politics were played on both sides of the aisle (but predominately by Republicans) and that became an untenable option.
I said at the time that Republicans were making a mistake by not going along with a bipartisan commission—as proposed in H.R. 3233—because the most likely outcome would be a select committee in the House over which Republicans would have no real control. And sure enough, the House passed H.Res. 503 to create the select committee.
Minority Leader Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) further made things worse by appointing a couple of Republicans to the select committee who weren’t interested at all in investigating the insurrection. Specifically, I’m referring to Reps. Jim Jordan (R-OH) and Jim Banks (R-IN). I don’t think two of the other picks, Reps. Rodney Davis (R-IL) and Kelly Armstrong (R-ND), were objectionable choices. The remaining member was Rep. Troy Nehls (R-TX), a freshman and former sheriff. Regardless, Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) didn’t seat any of McCarthy’s choices. Instead, she appointed Reps. Liz Cheney (R-WY) and Adam Kinzinger (R-IL) to the select committee.
It was a colossally stupid move on McCarthy’s part to not take the select committee seriously. Granted, I’m not sure which members of the House Republicans Conference other than Cheney, Kinzinger, or any of the others who voted for Trump’s impeachment would’ve taken the role with the respect it deserved.
The public testimonies of individuals who testified before the select committee highlighted several things about what happened before, during, and after January 6: a clear and alarming disregard for rule of law, authoritarian tendencies of the ex-president and those closest to him, a chief of staff who was utterly incapable of the job, and a crime family mentality. Separately, we once again have learned that the powers given to the presidency need to be reined in. It doesn’t matter who’s in power. We need to place checks on presidential power.
With the report of the select committee now out for the public to read, I do believe that House Republicans have at least one legitimate gripe about the work of the select committee, and that’s the lack of preparedness from law enforcement to deal with the events of that day.
Let me be clear here. The counting of electoral votes shouldn’t have been a big deal. This should’ve happened without any violence (or an attempted coup, for that matter), but the constant stream of lies of the ex-president and his cronies were consumed like a drug by his cult-like following.
On the intelligence side of the events leading up to and during January 6, the summary of the report states:
The intelligence community and law enforcement agencies did successfully detect the planning for potential violence on January 6th, including planning specifically by the Proud Boys and Oath Keeper militia groups who ultimately led the attack on the Capitol. As January 6th approached, the intelligence specifically identified the potential for violence at the U.S. Capitol. This intelligence was shared within the executive branch, including with the Secret Service and the President’s National Security Council.
Intelligence gathered in advance of January 6th did not support a conclusion that Antifa or other left-wing groups would likely engage in a violent counter-demonstration, or attack Trump supporters on January 6th. Indeed, intelligence from January 5th indicated that some left-wing groups were instructing their members to “stay at home” and not attend on January 6th. Ultimately, none of these groups was involved to any material extent with the attack on the Capitol on January 6th.
Neither the intelligence community nor law enforcement obtained intelligence in advance of January 6th on the full extent of the ongoing planning by President Trump, John Eastman, Rudolph Giuliani and their associates to overturn the certified election results. Such agencies apparently did not (and potentially could not) anticipate the provocation President Trump would offer the crowd in his Ellipse speech, that President Trump would “spontaneously” instruct the crowd to march to the Capitol, that President Trump would exacerbate the violent riot by sending his 2:24 p.m. tweet condemning Vice President Pence, or the full scale of the violence and lawlessness that would ensue. Nor did law enforcement anticipate that President Trump would refuse to direct his supporters to leave the Capitol once violence began. No intelligence community advance analysis predicted exactly how President Trump would behave; no such analysis recognized the full scale and extent of the threat to the Capitol on January 6th.
There’s a lot more detail to this in the report on the intelligence threats that both the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service, and the United States Capitol Police had in advance of January 6. Obviously, much of the violent rhetoric came from keyboard warriors who had no intention of backing up the threats. Still, it should’ve been enough to have mobilized a large-scale response to act as a deterrent to the droves of mouth-breathing conspiracy theorists who showed up. Some examples:
On December 26, 2020, the Secret Service received a tip about the Proud Boys detailing plans to have “a large enough group to march into DC armed [that] will outnumber the police so they can’t be stopped.” “Their plan is to literally kill people,” the informant stated. “Please please take this tip seriously ….” On December 29, 2020, Secret Service forwarded related warnings to Capitol Police that pro-Trump demonstrators were being urged to “occupy federal building[s],” including “march[ing] into the capital building and mak[ing] them quake in their shoes by our mere presence.”
Civilians also tipped off Capitol Police about bringing weapons to besiege the Capitol. One tipster, who had “track[ed] online far right extremism for years,” emailed Capitol Police warning “I’ve seen countless tweets from Trump supporters saying they will be armed,” and “I[’]ve also seen tweets from people organizing to ‘storm the Capitol’ on January 6th.”
On December 29, 2020, Secret Service forwarded related warnings to Capitol Police that pro-Trump demonstrators were being urged to “occupy federal building,” including “march[ing] into the capital building and mak[ing] them quake in their shoes by our mere presence.” Indeed, a Secret Service intelligence briefing on December 30th entitled “March for Trump,” highlighted the President’s “Will be wild!” tweet alongside hashtags #WeAreTheStorm, #1776Rebel, and #OccupyCapitols, writing “President Trump supporters have proposed a movement to occupy Capitol Hill.”
On January 1, 2021, a lieutenant in the intelligence branch at DC Police forwarded a civilian tip about “a website planning terroristic behavior on Jan 6th, during the rally” to Capitol Police intelligence. “There are detailed plans to storm federal buildings,” including “the capitol in DC on Jan 6th,” the tipster reported, linking to thedonald.win.
On January 2, 2021, the FBI discovered a social media posting that read, “This is not a rally and it’s no longer a protest. This is a final stand . . . many are ready to die to take back #USA . . . . And don’t be surprised if we take the #capital building.”
On January 3, 2021, a Parler user’s post – under the name 1776(2.0) Minuteman – noting “after weds we are going to need a new congress” and “Jan 6 may actually be their [Members of Congress] last day in office” reached the FBI and Capitol Police.
The FBI field office in Norfolk, Virginia issued an alert to law enforcement agencies on January 5th titled “Potential for Violence in Washington, D.C. Area in Connection with Planned ‘StopTheSteal’ Protest on 6 January 2021,” which noted:
An online thread discussed specific calls for violence to include stating ‘Be ready to fight. Congress needs to hear glass breaking, doors being kicked in, and blood… being spilled. Get violent...stop calling this a march, or rally, or a protest. Go there ready for war. We get our President or we die. NOTHING else will achieve this goal.’
In addition, the alert copied “perimeter maps [of the Capitol] and caravan pictures [that] were posted” on thedonald.win, particularly worrying that the “caravans … had the same colors as the sections of the perimeter” of the Capitol. Secret Service also knew about caravans planning to come to DC to “Occupy the Capitol.”
The Chief of the United States Capitol Police at the time of the attack, Steven Sund, has claimed that he asked the sergeants-at-arms to sign off on requesting the National Guard to be on standby to protect the Capitol days before the insurrection, but that request was denied by the sergeants-at-arms because of the optics. There are also conflicts with this claim. The report states:
On January 3rd, the same day Capitol Police’s Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD) issued a threat assessment indicating that “Congress itself is a target,” Chief Sund called House Sergeant-at-Arms Paul D. Irving to discuss requesting the DC National Guard to assist in policing the Capitol’s perimeter. Chief Sund needed approval from the Capitol Police Board, which consisted of Irving, Senate Sergeant-at-Arms Michael C. Stenger, and the Architect of the Capitol J. Brett Blanton. Chief Sund remembers that Irving responded immediately that he did not “like the optics” and that the intelligence did not support the request. Irving, however, remembers Chief Sund calling him to say the DC National Guard had offered 125 unarmed National Guardsmen to the USCP and MPD. He also remembered that, during a conference call, Chief Sund told Stenger and him that the National Guard would be utilized in similar fashion to the assistance provided to the DC police, namely, staffing intersections, and for traffic control to free up officers, but then could be used for crowd control, although he acknowledged that the Capitol campus does not have many intersections in need of staffing. The Capitol Police Board, including Chief Sund, later agreed that a request for the DC National Guard would not be necessary, particularly if the USCP was in an “all hands on deck” posture. Chief Sund agreed with Stenger and Irving that the intelligence did not support a request for DC National Guard assistance. According to Irving, Chief Sund did not believe the National Guard would add much to the USCP security plan for January6th. Chief Sund briefed the Capitol Police Board on the USCP’s enhanced security plan, and “all hands on deck posture”—including 1,200-plus officers, added Civil Disturbance Units (CDU), an enhanced Containment Emergency Response Team (“CERT”), and an expanded perimeter. Chief Sund did not believe, based on the intelligence he had, that it was then necessary to cancel officers’ days off.
The optics of dozens of National Guard soldiers standing guard at the Capitol would’ve looked horrible, but it would’ve looked no more horrible than in the days after January 6 when the Capitol Campus was completely surrounded by fencing and guarded by the National Guard. I had to visit the Capitol Complex roughly a month after the attack, and it was sad to see the Capitol surrounded by a fence, but it was also understandable why the fence was there and why there were National Guard soldiers on the grounds.
Republicans have tried to blame Pelosi for what happened at the Capitol. It’s absurd blame-shifting that, like much of the rest of the rhetoric from Republicans in the aftermath of January 6, attempts to whitewash the events of that day. Blame has also been thrown at the Metro Police Department. Again, this is absurd.
There has been accountability on the part of the law enforcement officials who failed to protect the Capitol. The main security officials at the Capitol—House Sargent-at-Arms, the Senate Sargent-at-Arms, and the Chief of the United States Capitol Police—each resigned. They had no choice but to do so.
All of this said, there needs to be more exploration into why the intelligence obtained before January 6 wasn’t used to fully prepare a response for the attack on the Capitol. Perhaps a bipartisan commission similar to the 9/11 Commission could’ve gotten us answers and recommendations to ensure that this would never happen again. Sadly, it may be a few years before Republicans—presumably after the ex-president’s effect on the party has worn off—accept the select committee’s report. Worse still, they may never accept it.