The war launched by Russia in Ukraine has been a defining moment of American foreign policy, but it’s coming at quite possibly the worst time in American politics. We’re more divided than we’ve been in a very long time and conspiracy theories that have no basis in reality are increasingly common. We’re also war weary, drowning in a river of red ink because of severe fiscal mismanagement from presidents of both parties and Congress. There are also worries about an economic downturn as the Federal Reserve tries to combat inflationary pressure.
I can understand some of the skepticism. According to the Watson Institute of International and Public Affairs at Brown University, the United States has spent or committed more than $8 trillion as a result of post-September 11, 2001 wars, including Afghanistan and Iraq, and more than 929,000 people have been killed. There’s an entire generation alive today who knows nothing but the United States in conflict.
At the same time, I’ve watched conservatives and some libertarians either criticize the Biden administration and Congress’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine, often while echoing the Kremlin’s talking points. Some have even, quite grotesquely, compared Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Adolf Hitler.
You can’t talk about Russia to some conservatives because of the investigation into the 2016 presidential election, but it’s a scavenger state that seeks to bully and manipulate to get its way. We know that Russia meddled in our elections in 2016. The founder of the Wagner Group, Yevgeny Prigozhin, has even admitted to election interference in the United States.
Some, particularly in the “national conservative” crowd, have even fawned over Russian authoritarian ruler Vladimir Putin. One “national conservative” commentator in a speech at Hillsdale College described Putin as “a symbol of national self-determination…Populist conservatives see him the way progressives once saw Fidel Castro, as the one person who says he won’t submit to the world that surrounds him.” This same far-right commentator said, Putin “is a hero to populist conservatives around the world and anathema to progressives.” Yes, fawn over an authoritarian to own the libs. This is just an example of the pathology that has infected the conservative movement, but that’s a topic for another day.
When Republican leader Kevin McCarthy (R-CA) said there wouldn’t be a blank check for Ukraine under Republican control of the House, it was music to this crowd’s ears. McCarthy has since tried to walk that comment back, but funding for Ukraine isn’t a certainty under Republican control of the House. Of course, the coming Republican majority is so small that the sane Republicans will hopefully be able to keep the support flowing to Ukraine until Russia is defeated.
I know some agreed with McCarthy’s initial comments because they balk at the cost of our assistance to Ukraine. According to the Congressional Research Service, the administration has committed approximately $17.6 billion to Ukraine since the beginning of the war in February. Congress has approved some $28 billion in aid via the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY 2022 and the Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act. The omnibus appropriations bill that Congress will pass this week has another $46.7 billion for Ukraine.
The cost has been my only hesitation as well. Just the same, assisting Ukraine is important geopolitically because we know that Putin, who considers the fall of the Soviet Union a “genuine tragedy” and “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century,” wants to expand the Russian sphere of influence and remake the Russian Empire. That puts several member states of the member of the North Atlanta Treaty Organization (NATO) at risk.
Of course, the pro-Putin caucus would say, “Well, NATO expansion is what caused Putin to invade Ukraine. We brought this on.” It’s such a lazy comment that involves no real critical thinking. Of the 30 member states of NATO, 14 of them are either former Eastern Bloc countries or were formed from Eastern Bloc countries. Those NATO member states are Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
It's not like NATO was having a party and invited Eastern Bloc countries to irritate Russia. No, these countries sought out membership. Why? Because even though the Soviet Union fell, Russia continued to try to assert its influence. What former Eastern Bloc countries saw in the early- to mid-1990s when Russia intervened in Chechnya made them seek out NATO membership.
Some may claim that the United States promised that NATO would grow “not one inch eastward.” This comes from a conversation between then-Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet dictator Mikhail Gorbachev. Baker disagrees with the interpretation. Gorbachev sent mixed signals about it. Regardless, even though a treaty came from the discussions between Baker and Gorbachev, there wasn’t any agreement in writing related to eastward expansion. That, you know, kind of matters.
Every step Russia has taken since the 1990s has only driven more countries into NATO membership. Ukraine isn’t a NATO member, of course, although it desires to be, and, once the country meets the criteria for inclusion, it should be made a NATO member. But the fact that Russia has pushed these countries into NATO is routinely ignored. Take this 1995 story from the Los Angeles Times about Russia’s offensive against Chechnya and how it reminded many former Eastern Bloc countries of the old Soviet Union and its willingness to use violence to exert influence:
Here is the view of Chechnya from the former East Bloc:
BALTIC STATES: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were forcibly annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940 and did not regain independence until 1991. Since then, the countries have squabbled with Moscow over Russian troop withdrawals and Russian minorities.
Official reaction has been cautious. But public sympathy for Chechnya runs deep. Chechen leader Gen. Dzhokar M. Dudayev, who commanded a Soviet strategic bomber brigade in Estonia, refused to mobilize against independence groups in 1991. “There but for the grace of God go the Baltic states,” said Latvian legislator Juris Sinka of the bloodshed in Chechnya.
Leaders say the fighting proves that Russia still holds “imperialistic reflexes.” It could sink a proposed agreement that would allow Russian troops to cross Lithuania by road en route to Russia’s Baltic Sea enclave of Kaliningrad.
POLAND: Warsaw has had strained relations with Moscow since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Eager to join NATO but aware of the shadow Russia casts, it has been difficult for Poland to balance westward leanings with eastward realities.
Following the United States, the government has characterized the fighting as an internal Russian matter. Other Poles have been more critical. The government has called Moscow to task for attacks on civilians.
There is no real fear that Russia will turn its military might on Poland. But the war has shaken confidence in Russian democracy and confirmed suspicions that violence remains a Moscow policy tool.
CZECH REPUBLIC: Reforms in Czechoslovakia were put down in 1968 when Soviet tanks rolled into Prague. Since splitting from Slovakia in 1993, Czechs have had no common border with the former Soviet Union and are on the fast track to Western integration.
The government was the first in Eastern Europe to criticize the Chechnya offensive. President Vaclav Havel has spoken of Russia’s “massive violation” of human rights.
The underdog Chechens have shamed some Czechs, who gave up in 1968 without a fight. More importantly, the conflict has bolstered arguments that Russia remains militarily adventurous.
SLOVAKIA: With the same Soviet-era history as the Czechs, democratic Slovakia has had a stronger Moscow tilt than its Czech neighbors. Dependent on Russian oil and other trade ties, the Slovak government issued a mild statement on Chechnya that did not mention human rights.
Slovak opposition has spoken of Russian “imperial tendencies” and has drawn comparisons to 1968. It has called for greater solidarity among countries eager for NATO security guarantees.
HUNGARY: Victim of the bloodiest Soviet military crackdown in Eastern Europe, Hungary later became the Wunderkind of the Soviet Bloc, adopting reforms long before its neighbors. In exchange, it was fiercely loyal to Moscow.
Commentators have drawn parallels between Chechnya and Hungary in 1956, but official reaction has been muted. Budapest remains heavily dependent on Russia for trade, especially energy, and has emphasized the conflict’s internal nature.
As chair of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Hungary has been bolder, condemning “serious violations of human rights” in Chechnya and urging Russia to use the OSCE to mediate the dispute.
UKRAINE: Long a docile Soviet republic, Ukraine gained its independence in 1991. Since then, Kiev, dependent on Russian oil and gas, has emphasized the importance of relations with Moscow.
Reaction to the fighting has been low key, with officials lamenting the loss of life but avoiding irritating Moscow.
With its own separatist problems in Crimea, it is unlikely Kiev will encourage Chechen self-determination or challenge Moscow’s defense of its territorial integrity. Even so, right-wing Ukrainians have traveled to Chechnya to support the rebels.
ROMANIA: Considered of minor strategic importance by the Soviets, Romania enjoyed relative independence from Moscow, albeit within an authoritarian context. Soviet troops withdrew in 1958, and Bucharest refused to join the invasion of Czechoslovakia.
The government, controlled by former Communists, has expressed concern for human rights in Chechnya and said it fears clashes could erupt elsewhere in the Caucasus region. With its own energy reserves, Bucharest remains less dependent than neighbors on Moscow.
Although still eager to join NATO, Romanians find comfort in Russia’s bungled offensive. The fighting has weakened Russia, they say, and revealed its military ineptitude--making moves in Eastern Europe less likely.
BULGARIA: Long the most loyal of the Soviet satellites, Bulgaria last month voted to return the former Communists--repackaged as socialists--to power. It has maintained good relations with Moscow, but with the new government not yet in place, there has been little reaction to events in Chechnya.
Looking at the countries mentioned in the piece, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland became NATO members in March 1999 while Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and Slovakia became NATO members in March 2004. Ukraine is the only country mentioned that hasn’t been admitted into NATO, and Ukrainians were against NATO membership for a time, but that changed because of Russia’s aggression.
A former American diplomat, Ken Moskowitz, further drives home the point of why these countries, as well as other, have an alliance with and, in most cases, become members of NATO (emphasis added):
Putin has promoted a narrative that the Western alliance took advantage of the chaos and weakness of Russia in the 1990s, and somehow pressured its former Warsaw Pact allies into joining NATO. But this was not the case at all. Having served in U.S. embassies for many years in communist Hungary (1986-1989) and later in post–Soviet bloc Ukraine (1997-1999) and Bulgaria (2009-2012), it is clear to me that Russia has mostly itself to blame for the alienation of its former allies.
…Western officials hardly took the initiative to strong-arm Eastern European countries into joining. On the contrary, starting with Hungary and Czechoslovakia, these former Soviet satellites whose aspirations for autonomy had been crushed by Soviet tanks (Budapest 1956, Prague Spring 1968) saw NATO membership as a shield from a future round of attacks from Russia. A wise post-Soviet Russian government policy would have been to issue swift and credible assurances that the era of Soviet-style suppression of true independence was past forever, and to implement that with concrete measures to reduce the threat perception.
I don’t expect to change the minds of the wannabe foreign policy experts on Facebook and Twitter who already have their minds made up because they’ve indulged Russian talking points, either directly or indirectly. But the evidence is clear that Russia’s aggression has forced countries, including Ukraine, to seek NATO membership and is actively trying to expand its sphere of influence. If Russia were still a communist country, conservatives would actively oppose Putin.
That’s probably what annoys me the most. Putin isn’t a communist, but he has all the authoritarian traits of a communist. Maybe that’s why some conservatives and libertarians are unwittingly (and, in some cases, wittingly) echoing Putin’s talking points—some in the conservative movement and, strangely, in the libertarian movement, don’t have a problem with authoritarianism.