The Strikes in the Caribbean Defy Everything We Know About the Drug Trade
The specious rationale for strikes in the Caribbean
The United States has now conducted more than twenty lethal strikes on small vessels in the Caribbean and eastern Pacific, a rapid escalation that the administration frames as a necessary response to “narco-terrorism” emerging from Venezuela. Yet, months into the campaign, the government has provided no publicly verifiable evidence that the boats it targeted were carrying illicit drugs, nor has it identified the individuals killed as suspects in any specific trafficking cases. None had been charged with, let alone convicted of, a crime.
The 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment adds another layer of complexity. Venezuela is not listed as a major conduit for fentanyl, cocaine, or synthetic precursors entering the United States. That disconnect between operational claims and available data is central to assessing the strikes. Before accepting a new category of military action as routine, it is necessary to understand what we actually know—and what the administration has not yet demonstrated. At its core, the problem is simple: the strikes target a route that barely exists, using legal authorities that haven’t been articulated, against individuals whose involvement in drug trafficking has not been established.
Released in May by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the 2025 National Drug Threat Assessment (NDTA) is the latest iteration of the annual, data-driven report that evaluates the most significant narcotics trends, trafficking routes, and criminal networks affecting the United States. The goal of the report is to provide Congress, law enforcement agencies, and the public with an authoritative picture of current drug threats so they can allocate resources, design interventions, and shape national strategy based on evidence rather than assumptions.
Since early September 2025, the Trump administration has carried out a series of lethal airstrikes against small vessels in the Caribbean Sea and, later, the eastern Pacific, describing the targets as drug-trafficking boats linked to Venezuelan criminal networks. Public reporting indicates that more than 20 strikes have been conducted, resulting in dozens of deaths. Still, the administration has not released independent evidence that the vessels were transporting narcotics or that the individuals killed were engaged in organized criminal activity. Officials have stated only that the operations were part of a broader counternarcotics initiative, providing few details on intelligence thresholds and/or targeting criteria. The result is a campaign framed as a national security necessity but supported by limited publicly verifiable information about the nature of the threat or the identities of those killed.
Obviously, there are legal issues with the strikes, considering there’s no specific legal authority. Congress also hasn’t authorized the strikes, which is a constitutional requirement under Article I, Section 8. That’s a problem, in and of itself.1 It’s also a separate matter unrelated to the criminal legal system.
The administration is basing these strikes on mere allegations of drug trafficking, which is certainly a crime, but due process has been thrown by the wayside. Due process isn’t just a legal nicety. It’s a part of our DNA as a nation. Due process requires the government to present evidence against the accused and gives those accused the right to argue their innocence. The individuals killed were not designated combatants and were targeted without judicial oversight, raising constitutional questions about extrajudicial lethal force against non-combatants.
Even in ordinary criminal investigations, the government routinely gets it wrong. Field drug tests alone generate tens of thousands of false arrests each year, and recent empirical research shows that even high-effort drug warrants—supported by surveillance, controlled buys, and corroborating tips—still fail to uncover contraband in a substantial share of searches. If we accept lethal force based on mere allegations, we’re outsourcing life-and-death decisions to systems that demonstrably fail under far lower stakes.
Internationally, the strikes challenge principles of necessity, distinction, and proportionality, especially if the government cannot demonstrate that the vessels posed an imminent threat or were directly participating in hostilities. Finally, the reported “double-tap” strike on survivors of an initial strike in September introduces potential violations of both international humanitarian law and human rights law, which prohibit intentionally killing persons who are hors de combat.
The focus on Venezuela is also peculiar. Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro isn’t a good guy. He has presided over a collapse in Venezuela’s democratic institutions and economy, marked by deepening authoritarianism, widespread repression, and a humanitarian crisis driven by mismanagement and corruption. The administration claims that cocaine from Venezuela, or that comes through that country, makes its way to the United States. Meanwhile, the administration has offered no real evidence to back this claim.
The NDTA says little about Venezuela. In fact, the only mentions of Venezuela are found in a section of the report, “Other Violent Transnational Criminal Organizations,” in which Tren de Aragua (TdA) is discussed over two paragraphs. TdA’s criminal activity includes human trafficking, assault, robbery, and drug trafficking. “In cities with large Venezuelan populations, TdA members operate violent extortion rackets resulting in assault, murder, and arson. TdA members also engage in organized retail theft, burglary, and street robbery operations that frequently result in violence. Firearms stolen by TdA robbery gangs are routinely distributed to other TdA members to further violent crime,” the report explains. “TdA drug trafficking activity occurs mainly at the street level and involves the distribution and sale of tusi in specific regional markets.”2 So our own government’s drug agency experts don’t claim that Venezuelan cocaine is flooding into America.
Cocaine predominantly comes from Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia. However, the vast majority of cocaine that comes to the United States—”[a]pproximately 84 percent”—is of Colombian origin. Colombia has been the primary source of cocaine in the United States for 25 years. Although cocaine is primarily sourced from these South American countries, Mexican TCOs smuggle it into the United States. “Mexico-based cartels obtain multi-ton cocaine shipments from South America and smuggle it via sea, air, or overland to Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean for subsequent movement into the United States,” the report notes. “Once in the United States, U.S. based criminal groups and street gangs distribute the cocaine, some of which is converted to crack at the local level.” If Venezuela were a meaningful cocaine corridor, the NDTA would reflect it; instead, it doesn’t register at all.
What about fentanyl? Chinese companies are the main source of the precursors needed to produce fentanyl, although recently the Chinese government has cracked down on the exportation of those precursors. Other sources include India and unnamed European countries. Mexican transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) manufacture fentanyl that comes into the United States. Venezuela isn’t mentioned as a country of concern for fentanyl.
For nearly 56 years—since President Richard Nixon named drug abuse “public enemy number one”—the United States has been in a so-called “war on drugs.” The use of the military to surveil and interrupt drug trafficking operations isn’t new. The use of lethal force as a freestanding tool of counternarcotics policy is.
The scope of presidential power being asserted here is unusually broad. By conducting lethal strikes against suspected traffickers outside any armed conflict, the administration is claiming authority to use military force without congressional authorization, without judicial process, and without demonstrating an imminent threat. If taken at face value, this theory would allow the president to target individuals anywhere in the world based on unverified allegations of criminal activity. Even if the allegations against these individuals are true, we shouldn’t kill them. We arrest them, charge them, bring them through the criminal legal system, and allow them to make a case in their defense. Have we so little regard for the rule of law and human life that we simply kill those we accuse of wrongdoing?
Five decades of experience show no evidence that military involvement meaningfully reduces the flow of drugs into the United States. Despite periodic claims that interdiction disrupts trafficking networks, federal data consistently indicate that overall drug availability, purity, and price trends remain unchanged by overseas military action. The NDTA reinforces this point: the primary routes for cocaine and synthetic drugs run through Mexico and the eastern Pacific, not through Venezuelan waters or international waters where the strikes have occurred. Because the administration has not demonstrated that the targeted vessels carried illicit substances or were connected to trafficking networks affecting the U.S. market, there is no empirical basis to conclude that these operations will reduce or disrupt supply.
What will happen—or, really, what is happening—is that the rule of law and international norms are being disregarded. Meanwhile, illicit drugs will remain widely available. We need a larger investment in programs that reduce demand for drugs. More than 50 years of efforts to reduce supply simply haven’t worked. Military strikes against alleged drug traffickers and/or a war with Venezuela aren’t going to stop the flow of drugs into the United States.
Ultimately, Congress needs to address this issue. The administration claims only the undelegated power that Congress allows. Most Republicans are, however, terrified of crossing Trump, despite the unconstitutionality of many of his actions.
Tusi, also known as “pink cocaine,” is a powdered substance that commonly includes MDMA and ketamine. The pink color comes from dye.